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We revisit the issue of self-fulﬁlling “waves of enthusiasm” as stationary ra-
tional expectations equilibrium outcomes in endogenous-growth models that
merge the quality-ladders with the expanding-variety mechanism. By con-
sidering a lab-equipment speciﬁcation with vertical-innovation intertemporal
spillovers but no intersectoral spillovers, we extend previous results of a neg-
ative impact of animal spirits on both horizontal aggregate R&D and number
of ﬁrms to a framework where decreasing returns to horizontal entry are not
a necessary condition. In contrast, our general-equilibrium setting allows us
to predict an eﬀect of animal spirits on R&D composition impacting neither
on aggregate growth nor on aggregate vertical R&D, as reduced outlays in
“mature” industries compensate for the increased R&D intensity in newly-
born industries.
Keywords: endogenous growth, horizontal and vertical R&D, stationary sunspot equi-
libria
JEL Classiﬁcation: O41, E32, D43, L16
11. Introduction
This paper studies the eﬀect of animal spirits, or sunspots, on the composition of aggre-
gate R&D, the industrial structure (number of ﬁrms and average ﬁrm size), consumption
level and aggregate growth in an endogenous-growth model. The model merges the
quality-ladders (vertical R&D) with the expanding variety (horizontal R&D) mechanism
under a non-scale full lab-equipment speciﬁcation without intersectoral spillovers. The
model is shown to admit multiple deterministic stationary equilibria and is used to study
the eﬀect of animal spirits in a full endogenous-growth setting.
Since Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983), among others, it is well-known that
we can construct economic environments in which changes in economic agents’ beliefs
per se, if shared by everyone, inﬂuence current choices in such a way that the variations
in beliefs are self-fulﬁlling, i.e., there are sunspot equilibria. More speciﬁcally, these are
rational expectations equilibria that are perfectly correlated with stochastic factors that
do not aﬀect the preferences, endowment and production set of any individual; hence,
only purely extrinsic uncertainty aﬀects prices and allocations.
This paper is concerned with the existence of sunspot equilibria in a continuous-time
endogenous-growth setting with multiple stationary equilibria, as highlighted by Cozzi
(2005). We focus on the concept of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria (SSE),1built as a
randomisation over multiple deterministic stationary equilibria, in the tradition of Cass
and Shell (1983). Due to the existence of multiple equilibria, there exists a coordination
problem between ﬁrms, which cannot be solved by referring solely to the fundamentals
of the economic system. Following a common practice in the literature, we assume that
ﬁrms tackle this coordination problem by referring to some extrinsic stochastic process,
which “selects” a speciﬁc equilibrium over the others. Cozzi (2005) studies simultaneously
the existence of multiple stationary deterministic equilibria and SSE, whereas we deﬁne
the latter explicitly in line with Cass and Shell (1983), after the derivation of the multiple
equilibria.
We adopt Cozzi (2005)’s approach in order to show that our lab-equipment model of
vertical and horizontal R&D admits multiple deterministic stationary equilibria (balanced-
growth paths, BGPs). Cozzi highlights the asymmetric BGPs admitted by R&D-driven
endogenous growth models that merge the quality-ladders with the expanding variety
mechanism, addressing the often observed waves of innovations characterized by a ﬂood
of quality improving R&D into newly introduced sectors. This is in accordance to some
of the stylised facts on industry life cycle (e.g., Klepper, 1996).2
Cozzi assumes that, as soon as a new good is introduced, there will be a “wave of
enthusiasm” for that sector, in the sense that the new product line attracts more vertical
R&D than the older ones, thus implying a “supernormal” process of creative destruc-
1If the extrinsic factors are subject to a stationary stochastic process, then the sunspot equilibria are
called “stationary”, that is, the eﬀect of beliefs agents hold about their environment does not vanish
asymptotically. As argued by, e.g., Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), this property is relevant namely
because stationary beliefs are likely to be the asymptotic outcome of many stable learning processes
(e.g., Woodford, 1990; and, more recently, Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon, 2007).
2For diﬀerent references on this topic, see Cozzi (2005).
2tion in the new sector. He also assumes that “enthusiasm” disappears after the ﬁrst
quality improvement, which implies that, along the BGP, horizontal innovation will be
discouraged owing to an expected increase in the rate of creative destruction until the
ﬁrst quality jump. Therefore, the model predicts an asymmetric equilibrium (in fact,
a continuum of asymmetric equilibria) with a larger vertical R&D intensity engaged in
improving the quality of already improved products, and thus of aggregate vertical R&D
intensity, at the expense of a lower horizontal R&D intensity.
Cozzi explores a version of Howitt (1999), who - similarly to e.g., Young (1998) and
Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) - presents a growth model that features the two types of
R&D within a knowledge-driven speciﬁcation. By focusing on the removal of scale eﬀects
of population, such models make the expanding-variety mechanism basically exogenous,
i.e., predict a steady-state ﬂow of new goods at the same rate as (or proportional to)
exogenous population growth.
In contrast, we consider with a full lab-equipment speciﬁcation, where the input to
both R&D activities and to diﬀerentiated-goods production is measured in units of the
homogeneous ﬁnal good (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6,7),3and which allows
for a fully endogenous expanding-variety mechanism, such that the ﬂow of new goods is
independent of population growth. Moreover, we model the quality-ladders mechanism
with intertemporal spillovers but no intersectoral spillovers, similarly to, e.g., Segerstrom
and Zolnierek (1999) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 7), and in contrast to
Howitt (1999) and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), among others.
Apart from a few studies (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Acemoglu, 2002), the
endogenous-growth literature has usually ignored the eﬀect of the R&D speciﬁcation on
results. In the knowledge-driven R&D models, such as Howitt (1999), horizontal inno-
vation competes away exogenously-driven scarce resources (labour) from manufacturing
and vertical innovation activities. In our lab-equipment model, this eﬀect is dampened as
horizontal and vertical innovation re-inforce each other’s impact on aggregate productiv-
ity, thus enlarging the pool of resources (the amount of ﬁnal good) available to allocate
as inputs to either manufacturing or R&D activities. On the other hand, models where
vertical innovation exhibits no intersectoral spillovers, such as ours, display an adjust-
ment mechanism that is absent from the models with intersectoral spillovers (such as
Howitt, 1999), based on the response of the relative average quality of the diﬀerentiated
goods to shocks that move the economy’s steady-state equilibrium.
Consequently, we are able to extend Cozzi (2005)’s result of a negative impact of
animal spirits on both horizontal aggregate R&D and the number of industries to a
framework where decreasing returns to horizontal entry are not a necessary condition. In
our model, the adjustment mechanism runs from the number of industries to the relative
average quality and then to the level of horizontal R&D. Instead, in Cozzi (2005), it runs
from horizontal R&D as characterised by decreasing marginal returns, to the number of
industries. Similarly to Cozzi, we predict that the “waves of enthusiasm” have an eﬀect
3Using Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)’s terminology, the assumption that the ﬁnal good is the R&D
input means that one adopts the “lab-equipment” version of R&D, instead of the “knowledge-driven”
speciﬁcation, in which labour is the only input.
3on the composition of R&D, but without impacting on aggregate vertical R&D: in our
explicit general-equilibrium setting, reduced outlays in “mature” industries compensate
for the increased R&D intensity in newly-born industries. Thus, we have an inter-R&D
composition eﬀect combined with an intra-(vertical)-R&D composition eﬀect. Besides,
the “waves of enthusiasm” have no impact on the aggregate growth rate but a positive
impact on the level of per-capita consumption, which contrasts with the, respectively,
positive and negative eﬀect obtained by Cozzi.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The next section brieﬂy discusses the
related literature on SSE. Section 3 outlines the symmetric equilibrium produced by the
model of vertical and horizontal R&D within a full lab-equipment speciﬁcation. Section 4
focus on the class of asymmetric general equilibria characterised by supernormal waves of
creative destruction in the newly introduced intermediate goods. Section 5 is concerned
with the existence of SSE obtained as a randomisation over the multiple deterministic
equilibria. Section 6 gives the conclusion.
2. Related literature on SSE
Distinct forms of SSE have been explored by the literature, in the context of diﬀerent
classes of general-equilibrium rational-expectations models.
The seminal work by Cass and Shell (1983) describes SSE obtained as a lottery, or
randomisation, over multiple deterministic equilibria within a discrete-time overlapping-
generation model. Using the stationary transition probabilities (from sunspot to no-
sunspot activity and vice versa) as weighting factors, SSE are derived as the convex
combination of the multiple solutions to the deterministic optimisation problem. Azari-
adis and Guesnerie (1986) derive a suﬃcient condition for the existence of SSE around
the single deterministic stationary equilibrium (or deterministic cycle) also within a
discrete-time overlapping-generation model. The authors identify a subset of all station-
ary transition probability matrices for which SSE exist as the solution of a “stochastic
deformation” of the deterministic optimisation problem. Woodford (1986) presents a
method of constructing SSE generated by a stationary transition probability matrix in a
discrete-time model that exhibits the indeterminacy of equilibrium near a steady state.
Our paper is in line with the ﬁrst approach, by studying a model with multiple station-
ary equilibria and constructing SSE as a randomisation over these equilibria. In this
respect, the SSE we study have a simpler origin than the other forms of SSE extant in
the literature.
Like us, more recently some authors have studied SSE in continuous-time inﬁnitely-
lived agents models of endogenous growth. Drugeon and Wigniolle (1996) develop an
extension of Grossman and Helpman (1991), and establish suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a SSE around the single deterministic stationary equilibrium, which include
restrictions from above on the stationary transition probabilities of a continuous-time
Markov process. Nishimura and Shigoka (2006) show how to construct a SSE in multi-
sector endogenous-growth models with local indeterminacy,4 based on, e.g., Lucas (1988)
4This paper extends the continuous-time analysis in Shigoka (1994).
4and Romer (1990).5 Those papers exhibit a positive relationship between sunspots (op-
timistic expectations of ﬁrms) and the long-run aggregate growth (just like Cozzi, 2005),
while in our model sunspots have no eﬀect on long-run aggregate growth.
By focusing on the endogenous number of ﬁrms, we also relate to some papers in the
business-cycle literature with endogenous ﬁrm entry and exit. Dos Santos Ferreira and
Dufourt (2006) study a discrete-time real-business-cycle (RBC) model, while Chatterjee,
Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993) present a discrete-time two-sector overlapping-generation
model. In both models, there is Cournot competition and variations in the number of ac-
tive ﬁrms are associated with the aggregate ﬂuctuations due to sunspots, constructed as
a randomisation between multiple deterministic steady states. Jaimovich (2007) studies
an RBC model with ﬁrm entry and exit where the SSE are derived upon local indeter-
minacy of the deterministic steady state. Notably, in all these models, sunspots have a
positive eﬀect on the number of active ﬁrms, whereas in our growth model (similarly to
Cozzi, 2005), sunspots have a negative eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms.6
3. The benchmark model
In this section, we ﬁrst present the full-endogenous growth model of quality ladders and
expanding variety and then derive its symmetric equilibrium. This, in turn, will serve as
a benchmark to the analysis carried out in Section 4, where “waves of enthusiasm” are
considered.
We explore a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy where there is
a single competitively-produced ﬁnal good that can be used in consumption, C, pro-
duction of intermediate goods, X, and horizontal and vertical R&D activities, Rn and
Rv, respectively. The ﬁnal consumption good is produced by a (large) number of ﬁrms
each using labour and a continuum of intermediate inputs indexed by ! on the interval
[0;N(t)].
The economy is populated by L identical dynastic families, each endowed with one
unit of labour that is inelastically supplied to ﬁnal-good ﬁrms. Thus, the total labour
level is L, which, by assumption, is constant over time. In turn, families invest in ﬁrms’
equity.
In the intermediate-good sector, ﬁrms can devote resources to R&D either to create
a new product line (a new industry) or, within an existing industry !, to improve the
quality of its good. Quality is indexed by j, where higher values denote higher quality
products. In particular, when a new quality rung is reached in !, the jth innovator
is the sole producer with the quality level j(!), where the parameter  > 1 measures
5Also within the endogenous-growth literature, Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) study the eﬀects of
animal spirits on long-run growth by developing an extension of Grossman and Helpman (1991)
where the realisation of innovations is separated in time from their implementation. However, in
their model, expectations are deterministic.
6Note also that we study the particular class of SSE of order two, i.e. with two possible events or
states of nature, as in Cass and Shell (1983), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), Drugeon and Wigniolle
(1996), Nishimura and Shigoka (2006), among others, but in contrast to, e.g., Shigoka (1994) and
Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006).
5the size of each quality upgrade. By improving on the current best quality index j, a
successful R&D ﬁrm earns monopoly proﬁts from selling the leading-edge j(!)+1 quality
to ﬁnal-good ﬁrms and, in equilibrium, lower qualities of ! are priced out of business.
As each leader is driven out of business by further innovation supported by other ﬁrm,
the duration of the monopoly is ﬁnite.
3.1. The consumer sector
The economy consists of L identical dynastic families who consume and collect income
(dividends) from investments in ﬁnancial assets (equity) and labour income. We assume
consumers have perfect foresight concerning the aggregate rate of technological change
over time,7 and choose the path of ﬁnal-good aggregate consumption fC(t);t  0g to









where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and  > 0 is the constant elasticity of
marginal utility with respect to consumption. Intertemporal utility is maximised subject
to the ﬂow budget constraint (henceforth, the dot denotes time derivative)
_ a(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t)L   C(t) (2)
where a stands for households’ ﬁnancial assets (equity) holdings, measured in terms of
ﬁnal-good output Y . Households take the real rate of return on ﬁnancial assets, r, and
the real labour wage, w, as given. The initial level of wealth a(0) is also given, whereas
the condition limt!1e 
R t
0 r(s)dsa(t)  0 is imposed in order to prevent Ponzi schemes.






(r(t)   ) (3)
as well as the transversality condition lim
t!1
e tC(t) a(t) = 0.
3.2. Production and price decisions
We consider that the ﬁnal-good sector faces the following production function







where L is labour input; (1   ), 0 <  < 1, is the labour share in production; x(!;t) is
the amount used of the intermediate good !, weighted by its quality level j(!;t),  > 1.
7As we will see below, the uncertainty associated with R&D at the industry level creates jumpiness in
microeconomic outcomes. However, as the probabilities of successful R&D across industries are inde-
pendent and there is a continuum of industries this jumpiness is not transmitted to macroeconomic
variables.
6It is implicit in (4) that only the highest grade of each ! 2 [0;N(t)] are actually produced
and used in equilibrium, meaning x(j;!;t) = x(!;t); thus, N(t) > 0 is the measure of
how many diﬀerent intermediate goods (i.e., product lines) ! exist at time t.
Letting ﬁnal output be the numeraire (that is, setting its price equal to unity), ﬁrms
in the ﬁnal-good sector seeks to maximise proﬁt by choice of L and x(!);! 2 [0;N(t)].
From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to x one derives the aggregate demand of !







where p(!;t) is the price of ! relative to the ﬁnal-good price.
The intermediate good is nondurable and entails a unit marginal cost of production,
measured in terms of ﬁnal-good output Y . Since there is a continuum of intermediate
goods, one can assume that ﬁrms are atomistic and take as given the price of ﬁnal out-
put (numeraire). Monopolistic competition, therefore, prevails and ﬁrms face isoelastic
demand curves (5). The obtained intermediate-good proﬁt maximising price is a con-
stant markup over marginal costs p(!;t)  p = 1
,8 which implies the aggregate quantity
produced of !





Using the results above we get the proﬁt accrued by the monopolist in !













Substituting (6) in (4) yields the aggregate output
Y (t) = 
2









is the intermediate-input aggregate quality index, which can also be interpreted as the
technological-knowledge stock of the economy, since, by assumption, there are no inter-







1   L  Q(t) (10)
8We assume that
1
 <  ,
1
 < 1, that is, if
1
 is the price of the leading-edge good, the price of the
next lowest grade,
1
 , is less than the unit marginal cost of production. Only in this case are the
lower grades of ! unable to provide any eﬀective competition for the leading-edge type, so that its
producer can charge the unconstrained monopoly price.




(!;t)d! =    L  Q(t) (11)
3.3. R&D decisions
As in the standard model of quality ladders, ﬁrms decide over their optimal vertical-R&D
level, which constitutes the search for new designs (blueprints) that lead to a higher
quality of existing intermediate goods. Each new design is granted a patent, meaning
that a successful researcher retains exclusive rights over the use of his/her improved
intermediate good. In each industry only (potential) entrants can do R&D and innovation
arrival follows a Poisson process.9
Let Ii(j;!;t) denote the instantaneous probability of R&D success by potential entrant
i in industry ! when the highest quality is j (I is also interpreted as the vertical innovation
rate). This probability is independently distributed across ﬁrms, industries and over time,
and depends on the ﬂow of resources Rvi(j;!;t) devoted to vertical R&D by entrants in
each ! at t, measured in units of the ﬁnal good. We assume perfect competition among
entrants and that each entrant’s instantaneous probability of R&D success is given by
a relation exhibiting constant returns in R&D expenditures, Ii(j;!;t) = Rvi(j;!;t) 
(j;!;t), where the function  is the same for every ﬁrm in ! and captures the eﬀect of









where  > 0 is a constant that stands for the (ﬂow) ﬁxed vertical-R&D cost. In order to
eschew the usual scale-eﬀect in endogenous growth models associated to the size of the
labour force, in (12) we assume that an increase in market scale, measured as L, dilutes
the eﬀect of R&D outlays on innovation probability. Observe also that the R&D tech-
nology exhibits intertemporal spillovers but no intersectoral spillovers (e.g., Segerstrom
and Zolnierek, 1999), in contrast with, e.g., Howitt (1999) and Dinopoulos and Thomp-





i Ii(j;!;t), such that







9Zero equilibrium R&D by incumbents is a well-known result claimed by the traditional quality-ladders
models (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992). However, as shown by Cozzi (2007), the assumption of
R&D ﬁrms (potential entrants and the incumbent) operating under perfect competition and constant
returns at the ﬁrm level, taken rigorously, yields an indeterminate investment for the incumbent,
which is consistent with the latter doing any amount of R&D, from zero to a very large number. Our
assumption of zero equilibrium R&D by incumbents is only for the sake of simplicity in what regards
the microstructure of our model.
8As the terminal date of each monopoly arrives with probability I (j;!;t) per (in-
ﬁnitesimal) increment of time, the present value of a monopolist’s proﬁts is a random





t (r(v)+I(j;!;v))dvds, where r is the equilibrium market
real interest rate and (j;!;t) is given by (7). Along the BGP, r and I are constant;





On the other hand, with free-entry into the vertical R&D business, we have the free-
entry condition
I(j)  V (j + 1) = Rv(j) (15)





According to (16), the relationship between r and I is independent of t, !, and j. Along
the BGP, where we expect I to be constant, r is also constant.
Variety expansion results from R&D aimed at creating a new intermediate-good line,
corresponding to a new ﬁrm, at a cost of  units of ﬁnal output. In particular, we view
the creation of new product lines as a product development activity without positive
spillovers and allow for entry as well as exit of product lines from the market. After a
new product is launched, an initial quality level is observed, drawn at random from the
distribution of quality indexes matching the existing product lines (e.g., Dinopoulos and
Thompson, 1998; Howitt, 1999). Let q(j;!;t)  
j(!;t)(

1 ) be an alternative measure




q(j;!;t)d! = q(j;  !;t)  N(t) (17)
where q(j;  !;t)  E!(q) is the average of q over industries and  ! denotes the average
intermediate-good sector for a given N(t).
We assume perfect competition among R&D ﬁrms and static constant returns com-






Ne(t) is the contribution to the instantaneous ﬂow of new product line
by R&D ﬁrm e at a unit cost of  and Rne (t) is the ﬂow of resources devoted to hor-
izontal R&D by e at t. Cost  is the same for every ﬁrm doing horizontal R&D, with
  (N) = N,  > 0 (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6).11By aggregating









10We assume that entrants are risk-neutral and, thus, only care about the expected value of the ﬁrm.
11The positive dependence of  on N is necessary to eschew the explosive growth that would occur in
our model, e.g., if  were constant over time. This is not the case in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004,
ch. 6)’s basic model of pure expanding variety.
9Rn(t) =  _ N(t) (18)
Since entry generates value V (q(j;  !;t))  V (j;  !;t), a free-entry equilibrium requires
that new product lines are created (or destroyed) at a rate _ N necessary to ensure the
free-entry condition _ N(t)  V (j;  !;t) = Rn (t), which simpliﬁes to
V (j;  !;t) = (N) (19)
Finally, a consistency condition between vertical and horizontal arbitrage conditions
is needed. Having in mind that horizontal entry occurs at the average product quality,
q (j;!;t), ﬁrstwe ﬁnd an expression for Rv(j   1;  !;t), by solving (13) in order to Rv,
considering the average intermediate-good sector,  !, and applying to j   1, for a given
N(t),
Rv(j   1;  !;t) = I(t)    L  q(j;  !;t) (20)
where we used I(t)  I(j   1;  !;t). Then, from the vertical free-entry condition, (15),
solved in order to V , we get V (j;  !;t) =
Rv(j 1; !;t)
I(j 1; !;t) . Together with (20), we have
V (j;  !;t) =   L  q(j;  !;t) (21)
Last, equating (21) and the horizontal free-entry condition, (19), together with (17),
yields







3.4. The symmetric general-equilibrium BGP
The dynamic general equilibrium is deﬁned by the paths of fN(t);C(t);Q(t);I(t);r(t);t  0g,
such that: (i) consumers, ﬁnal-good ﬁrms and intermediate-good ﬁrms solve their prob-
lems; (ii) consistency conditions are met; and (iii) markets clear.
The ﬁnal-product market equilibrium condition is
Y (t) = C(t) + X(t) + Rv(t) + Rn(t) (23)
which deﬁnes the aggregate resource constraint. At the aggregate level, the households’
equilibrium condition (balance sheet) is
a(t) = V (j;  !;t)  N(t) = (t)  N(t) (24)
which we can prove, by substituting in (2), that is equivalent to (23) (see Gil, Brito, and
Afonso, 2008).
We now derive and characterise the interior BGP. Let gy 
_ y
y, the growth rate of y.
Along the BGP, the aggregate resource constraint (23)is satisﬁed with Y , X, C, Rv and
Rn growing at the same constant rate. By considering (8) and by time-diﬀerentiating
10(22) with (N) = N, the following necessary conditions for the existence of a BGP are
derived: (i) gC = gQ = g; (ii) gI = 0; and (iii)
gQ
gN = ( + 1), gN 6= 0. Observe that g is
the long-run aggregate growth rate and that gQ and gN are monotonically related.
By assuming that the number of sectors, N, is large enough to treat Q as time-
diﬀerentiable and the time interval dt is small enough to have _ Q non-stochastic, we
time-diﬀerentiate (17) in order to get _ Q(t) =
R N(t)
0 _ q(j;!;t)d!+q(N;t) _ N(t). After some
algebraic manipulation of the latter, we can write







Next, solve (3) with respect to r and note that, along the BGP, gC = g, to get
r =  + g. The latter, combined with g = (1 + )  gN, (25) and (16), and solved with
























!1g = gno entry and that g > 0 requires  > 0. Since, from (3), g = gC =
1
 (r   ), then r >  must occur; this condition also guarantees gN > 0.12 Thus, under
a suﬃciently productive technology, our model predicts a BGP with constant positive g
and gN, where the former exceeds the latter by an amount corresponding to the growth
of intermediate-good quality, driven by vertical innovation; to verify this, just check (25)










, which is positive if I > 0. This implies that
the consumption growth rate equals the growth rate of the number of varieties plus the
growth rate of intermediate-good quality, in line with the view that industrial growth
proceeds both along an intensive and an extensive margin. A similar result can be found,
e.g., in Arnold (1998), Peretto (1998) and Howitt (1999).13
But diﬀerently from Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Howitt (1999) and other
quality-ladders models with expanding variety, gN is not linked to the (exogenous) pop-
ulation growth rate.14 The dynamic decreasing returns due to (N) = N, per se,
determine a constant N along BGP (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6); however,
the N expansion is sustained by technological-knowledge accumulation, as the expected



















where Q = ^ Qe
gt and ^ Q denotes detrended Q. Thus, the transversality condition implies  > (1 )g;
i.e., r > g, since g =
1
 (r   ). This condition also guarantees that attainable utility is bounded, i.e.,
the integral (1) converges to inﬁnity.
13In Peretto (1998)’s endogenous growth model with cost-reducing R&D, the intensive margin is due to
productivity growth, whilst in Arnold (1998) reﬂects human-capital accumulation.
14The link between the expanding variety and the exogenous population growth can also be found in the
class of endogenous-growth model where incumbents do in-house cost-reducing R&D, while entrants
bring new products to the market, such as Peretto and Connolly (2007).
11growth of intermediate-good quality due to vertical R&D makes it attractive, in terms
of intertemporal proﬁts, for potential entrants to always put up an entry cost, in spite of
its increase with N. In this sense, it is not necessarily the larger economy, measured by
population size, that produces the greater number of varieties, but that with the larger
technological-knowledge stock, which thus emerges as the relevant endogenous economic
size measure.
4. The model with asymmetric equilibria
We now adopt Cozzi (2005)’s approach in order to show that the lab-equipment model
of vertical and horizontal R&D admits (at least) a continuum of asymmetric station-
ary deterministic equilibria, besides the symmetric equilibrium derived in the previous
section.
4.1. R&D decisions
We focus on the class of asymmetric general equilibria characterised by supernormal
waves of creative destruction in the newly introduced intermediate goods, and which
satisfy the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Consider  2 (1;1), constant across industries and over time. When
a new intermediate good ! is introduced, vertical R&D will be  times higher in
industry ! than in the product lines that have experienced at least one quality jump
(“mature” industries). After the next quality jump occurs in !, its vertical R&D
level will become equal to the R&D carried out in the other “mature” industries.
This assumption is in line with some stylised facts on industry life cycle (e.g., Klepper,
1996), according to which frequently new industries are initially and quickly developed by
new entrants. Moreover, it implies that the BGP expected value of the ﬁrst monopolist





  V (j) (28)
where V (j) =
(j)







2 (0;1);8r;I;> 0;  2
(1;1) captures the negative eﬀect of increased creative destruction on the value of the
monopolist ﬁrm (i.e., V E < V , due to  > 1). Provided that I and r are constant along
the BGP, 
 is also constant.This implies that the horizontal R&D free-entry condition
can be rewritten as
(N) = 
  V (j) (29)
Now we turn to vertical innovation under Assumption 1. Let NI denote the number of
industries that have not experienced the ﬁrst quality jump. Since all new industries start
without having innovated in the vertical direction, NI increases as far as N increases;
12however, at any t, there is also a number   I  NI that innovates and leaves the group
of NI. Thus, _ NI =    I  NI + _ N, from which, with NI







Under Assumption 1, a general BGP equilibrium with “waves of enthusiasm” requires
that ﬁnancial markets recognise the “enthusiasm” about the newly-introduced industries





  A  I (31)
where A 
h




2 (1;1);8gN;I;> 0;  2 (1;1). This implies that the
average Poisson rate of vertical innovation at the aggregate level, AI, exceeds the average
Poisson rate in the “mature” industries, I. Thus, investors require that the real interest
rate, r, equals the dividend rate, 
V , plus the rate of capital gain  AI. The latter term
incorporates the fact that all industries are undertaking vertical R&D every period but
some are still waiting for their ﬁrst innovation in the vertical direction. Provided that
I and gN are constant along the BGP, A is also constant. Substituting (15) solved in
order to V , together with (7) and (13), in (31), yields













This is our model’s version of arbitrage equation (H´) in Cozzi (2005) (itself a generali-
sation of equation (H) in Howitt, 1999).15Having in mind that 0 < 
 < 1, it is clear from
(33) that “waves of enthusiasm” imply a smaller N vis-à-vis the symmetric equilibrium
implicit in (22): a lower N enhances average quality,
Q
N, for a given Q (i.e., relative
average quality 1
N) received by a newly-born industry, in order to compensate for the
higher subsequent creative destruction rate (
 1 > 1) due to  > 1. On the right-hand
side of (33), we get 
 1 ! 1 with  ! 1, and 
 1 ! +1 with  ! +1. In the latter
case, N must approach zero in order to elevate relative average quality to inﬁnity.
Notice that the described mechanism: (i) stems from our assumption of no intersectoral
spillovers in vertical innovation, in as much as the latter implies that the BGP relative
average quality is given by 1
N (see (17)); (ii) is only weakened by   (N), 0 > 0, in
(33); (iii) does not depend qualitatively on the presence of static decreasing returns to
horizontal R&D.
15To see this, consider Cozzi’s arbitrage equation with “waves of enthusiasm” as a certain event, i.e.,
pE = 1.
13In contrast, Howitt (1999)’s model features both intersectoral spillovers in vertical
innovation and static decreasing returns to horizontal R&D; the former assumption im-
plies that relative average quality is independent of the number of industries in BGP (see
Howitt’s equation (13)), and thus the latter assumption is necessary to ensure that the
consistency condition between vertical and horizontal innovation has a ﬁnite and deter-
mined solution (see Howitt’s equation (H)). “Waves of enthusiasm”, as analysed by Cozzi
(2005), imply a lower number of industries than in the symmetric equilibrium in Howitt
(1999)’s model, too, but the mechanism runs from horizontal R&D - which decreases as
a direct eﬀect of decreasing marginal returns to horizontal R&D in Cozzi’s equation (H´)
- to the number of industries.16
4.2. The asymmetric general equilibrium BGP
In order to derive the asymmetric equilibrium characterised by “waves of enthusiasm” in
an explicit general-equilibrium setting, we must take into account that the ﬁnal-product
market equilibrium condition is now given by
Y (t) = X(t) + C(t) + Rn(t) + A  Rv(t) (34)
where ARv is the aggregate vertical R&D and Rv is the vertical R&D conducted by the
“mature” industries. At the aggregate level, the households’ balance sheet, equity being
taken at its market value, is now
a(t) = V (j;  !;t)  N(t) = (t)  
 1  N(t) (35)
while the households’ ﬂow budget constraint is
_ a(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t)L   C(t) + (t) (36)
where  is a real pure proﬁt. We can prove, by substituting (35) in (36), that the former
is equivalent to (34) (see Appendix A).
The necessary conditions for the existence of a BGP continue to be those presented in
Subsection 3.4.
Again, by time-diﬀerentiating (17), and by taking into account that the asymmetric
BGP is characterised by (30), we can write (see (25))







which is our version of vertical innovation equation (14) in Cozzi (2005).17 Then, solve
(3) with respect to r, to get r = +g. The latter, combined with (32) and (37), yields
16We can easily add static decreasing returns to horizontal R&D to our model, as in Howitt (1999) and
Cozzi (2005), such that _ N =
1
(Rn), 
0 > 0, 











0 > 1 on the right-hand side of (33) will be matched by a decrease in both N and Rn.
See Appendix B for details.


















































 ( + 1) + 1

(39)
which is the BGP aggregate growth rate under asymmetric equilibrium satisfying As-
sumption 1. However, (26) is also the expression for the BGP aggregate growth rate
under symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,  = 1 ) A = 
 = 1), as found in (26). Given
g = (1 + )  gN, the same is true for gN:
Now, let s denote a given variable value along the symmetric BGP, as derived for the
model in Section 3. Then, from (39) and (32), we have, respectively
g = gs , gN = gs
N (40)
A  I =
 





plus, given (33) and our assumption of (N) = N, for a given Q,
N = (
    L  Q)
1
+1 < Ns (42)
Also, by solving (33) with respect to  and substituting in (18), we get, for a given Q,
Rn =   _ N = 
  gN    L  Q < Rs
n (43)
and, by solving (13) with respect to Rv and aggregating across ! having in mind the
asymmetric BGP is characterised by an aggregate rate of creative destruction A  I,
A  Rv = A  I    L  

1   Q = Rs




















 L  Q > Cs (45)
Observe that, given Q and L, the latter can be interpreted as the productivity-adjusted
level of per-capita consumption.
In Appendix C, we prove the existence of a ﬁnite and unique A > 1, given the set
(;gs
N;Is), that solves for the asymmetric BGP (26)-(45). Moreover, because the number
 2 (1;1) is arbitrary, it can then be shown that there is a continuum of asymmetric
BGPs (see Section 5, below, for more detail).
Thus, in our model, the “waves of enthusiasm” have no impact on aggregate vertical
R&D intensity (that is, for a given Q, or a given Y - see (8)), as reduced outlays in
15“mature” industries compensate for the increased R&D intensity in newly-born industries.
This intra-R&D composition eﬀect is “forced” by the fact that ﬁnancial markets link the
eﬀective return to vertical R&D (the real interest rate plus the average rate of creative
destruction) to the fundamentals, which must be the same whether we consider the
symmetric or the asymmetric equilibrium.18 The latter eﬀect, together with the fact that,
as a consequence of our lab-equipment speciﬁcation, vertical innovation is the ultimate
growth engine, in the sense that it sustains both variety expansion and aggregate growth,
implies that the “waves of enthusiasm” have no impact on either the growth rate of the
number of varieties or the aggregate growth rate. This result contrasts with the positive
eﬀect obtained by Cozzi (2005).
Our results coincide with Cozzi’s in what concerns the negative impact of “waves of en-
thusiasm” on horizontal R&D intensity. However, as already alluded above with respect
to the eﬀect of “waves of enthusiasm” on N, the mechanism at work is subtly diﬀerent in
our case: it predicts a lower horizontal R&D in response to a lower N vis-à-vis the sym-
metric equilibrium, since the latter requires a smaller _ N to sustain a given BGP growth
rate, gN, independently of the type of returns to horizontal R&D we postulate.19 Given
the fact that, in our model, “waves of enthusiasm” have no impact on the productivity-
adjusted level of per-capita ﬁnal-good production, Y
QL (see (8)) , then the lower horizontal
R&D intensity implies that more resources become available to per-capita consumption,
also in productivity-adjusted terms, C
QL. This contrasts with the negative eﬀect on the
latter found by Cozzi.
5. Stationary sunspot equilibria
In the previous sections, we described a set of multiple stationary deterministic equi-
libria (BGPs) admitted by our model: one symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of
asymmetric equilibria characterised by “waves of enthusiasm”. This section is concerned
with the existence of stationary equilibria in which all ﬁrms expect a “wave of enthusiasm”
for the new product, such that “waves of enthusiasm” constitute self-fulﬁlling stationary
rational expectations equilibrium outcomes.
Because of the existence of multiple equilibria, there exists a coordination problem
between ﬁrms,20which cannot be solved by referring solely to the fundamentals of the
economic system. Following a common practice in the literature, we explicitly assume
that ﬁrms tackle this coordination problem by referring to some extrinsic stochastic
process, as described below:
Assumption 2. At each t, all R&D ﬁrms observe an exogenous variable z(t) 2 f0;1g and
establish a link between this observation and the existence of a “wave of enthusi-
18Notice term
 
 in (32) and (16).
19Observe that the assumption of   (N);
0 > 0, has no qualitative eﬀects on the described mecha-
nism.
20As noted by Cozzi (2005), since after the second quality jump all sectors experience the same degree
of vertical innovation, before that jump R&D ﬁrms are indiﬀerent among sectors, which opens the
door namely to an asymmetric allocation of R&D.
16asm” towards a newly created intermediate good ! at t: “no wave of enthusiasm”
(z(t) = 0) or “wave of enthusiasm” (z(t) = 1). Consider p 2 (0;1), constant across
industries and over t. With probability p, z(t) = 1, i.e., vertical R&D will be  > 1
times higher in the new industry than in the “mature” industries. With probability
1   p, z(t) = 0, i.e., the new industry is immediately as R&D intensive as the
“mature” industries.
Observe that, like in Cozzi (2005), the nature of extrinsic uncertainty is industry speciﬁc.
As the probabilities of “wave of enthusiasm” across industries are independent and there
is a continuum of industries, uncertainty is not transmitted to macroeconomic variables.
Therefore, the SSE studied herein do not generate aggregate uncertainty.21
Having Assumptions 1 and 2 in mind, SSE are then built as a randomisation over
the multiple deterministic stationary equilibria (e.g., Cass and Shell, 1983, Drugeon and
Wigniolle, 1996 and Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt, 2006). First, consider the BGP














 V (j) withprobabilityp (46b)
where  is given by (7).
Next, recall from Subsection 3.3 that the contribution to the instantaneous ﬂow of
new goods by R&D ﬁrm e in the horizontal-R&D sector is _ Ne = 1
(N)Rne. Given perfect
competition among innovator ﬁrms, each of them takes as given the marginal value of





_ Ne  V E   Rne

+ (1   p) 

_ Ne  V   Rne
i
The single-valuedness and continuity of the latter, for a given p, is guaranteed by the
strict concavity and continuity of the maximand with respect to Rne. After aggregation,
the associated ﬁrst-order condition implies the horizontal R&D free-entry condition
(N) = (1   p)  V (j) + p  V E(j) = 












p in (33), we have 
 1
p ! 1 with p ! 0 _  ! 1, and 
 1
p ! (1   p) 1 with
 ! +1. Thus, in the latter case, with p 2 (0;1), N need not approach zero and hence
elevate relative average quality to inﬁnity.
21Thus, the deterministic nature of the households’ optimisation program is not aﬀected by the consid-
eration of sunspots (see Subsection 3.1, above).
22Without sunspots, R&D ﬁrms solve Rne = argmax

_ Ne  V   Rne

, with the associated ﬁrst-order
condition implying (19). Given constant returns to scale, this is equivalent to consider directly the
free-entry condition _ Ne  V = Rne, as in Subsection 3.3.
17On the other hand, the vertical-innovation arbitrage condition and the aggregate
growth rate are now given by

















2 (1;1);8gN;I;> 0; p 2 (0;1); > 1 and p =
1 ) Ap = A.Then, the combination of (3), (48) and (49) yields (39), while the BGP
relationships (40)-(45) apply now with 
 and A replaced by 
p and Ap, respectively.
In Appendix C, we prove the existence of a ﬁnite and unique Ap > 1, given the set
(;p;gs
N;Is), that solves for the asymmetric BGP under Assumption 2.
Let the variables in the state without “waves of enthusiasm” be indexed by 0, whereas
the ones in the state with “waves of enthusiasm” be indexed by 1. We deﬁne formally a
SSE as follows:
Deﬁnition. For a given  2 (1;1), a SSE is a quintuple (
z;Az;p)z2f0;1g, with 
0 =
A0 = 1, 
1 = 
p 2 (0;1), A1 = Ap 2 (1;1) and p 2 (0;1), that yields the equality
parts in (40)-(45), with 
 and A replaced by 
z and Az, z 2 f0;1g, respectively.
Finally, a continuous monotonic relationship between the BGP values of the endogenous
variables under Assumption 1 and 2 and, respectively,  and p is needed, such that






d , it is easy to verify that Ap and 
p relate monotonically with . In concrete,
Ap increases monotonically with  at a decreasing rate (lim!1
dAp
d = 0), whereas 
p
decreases monotonically with  also at a decreasing rate. With respect to the latter,
we add that, on one hand, the direct negative eﬀect of  on 
p overweights the positive
eﬀect of  through Ap on 
p and, on the other hand, the decreasing marginal direct eﬀect
of  on 
p overweights the impact of lim!1
dAp
d = 0. Re-iterating the same steps as
above, one can give a proof of the monotonic relationship between p and, respectively, Ap
and 
p. Because sunspots are the random factors that, with probability p, choose one
speciﬁc realisation from the underlying multiple deterministic equilibria, and because the
numbers  and p are arbitrary, then there is a continuum of SSE.
With these ingredients, we are able to rewrite Cozzi (2005)’s Proposition 1 as
Proposition 1. A continuum of BGPs exist parametrised by “wave of enthusiasm” prob-
abilities p 2 (0;1) and amplitudes  2 (1;1). Comparing such BGPs, the larger p
and , the smaller the number of ﬁrms, aggregate horizontal R&D and vertical
R&D in “mature” industries, and the larger vertical R&D in newly-born industries
and the level of per-capita consumption. Aggregate vertical R&D, the growth rate
of the number of varieties and of intermediate-good quality, and thus the aggregate
growth rate, do not depend on either p or .
In what follows, we brieﬂy relate our main results to recent work on SSE. With respect
to the impact of sunspots (optimistic expectations of ﬁrms) on the number of ﬁrms, our
18growth model predicts a negative relationship similarly to Cozzi (2005). The opposite re-
sult obtains in the business-cycle models with endogenous ﬁrm entry by, e.g., Chatterjee,
Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993), Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) and Jaimovich
(2007). In our study, sunspots have no eﬀect on long-run aggregate growth, in contrast
to Cozzi (2005), but also to, e.g., the endogenous-growth models analysed in Drugeon
and Wigniolle (1996) and Nishimura and Shigoka (2006). These papers all exhibit a
positive relation between sunspots and the aggregate growth rate. On the other hand,
the positive impact we ﬁnd of sunspots on per-capita consumption is in line with, e.g.,
Chatterjee, Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993) and Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006),
but opposes to the negative eﬀect described by Cozzi (2005).
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we revisit the issue of self-fulﬁlling “waves of enthusiasm” as stationary
rational expectations equilibrium outcomes in endogenous-growth models that feature
both the quality-ladders and the expanding-variety mechanism. For that purpose, we
develop a model that merges the two mechanisms under a non-scale full lab-equipment
speciﬁcation without intersectoral spillovers.
The model predicts, under a suﬃciently productive technology, a stationary BGP with
constant positive growth rates, and where the consumption growth rate equals the growth
rate of the number of varieties plus the growth rate of intermediate-good quality, in line
with the general view that industrial growth proceeds both along an intensive and an
extensive margin. Nevertheless, diﬀerent from Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and
Howitt (1999), among others, the growth of the number of varieties is not linked to the
exogenous population growth rate. It is sustained by endogenous technological-knowledge
accumulation, as the expected growth of intermediate-good quality makes it attractive
for potential entrants to always put up an entry cost, in spite of its upward trend.
In line with Cozzi (2005), this paper focuses on asymmetric equilibria derived from
self-fulﬁlling prophecies a la Cass and Shell (1983), instead of any asymmetry in market
fundamentals, such as cost structures or technologies. It shows that the BGP composition
of aggregate R&D, the industrial structure (number and average ﬁrm size) and the per-
capita consumption level can be aﬀected in a relevant manner by animal spirits.
However, by considering a vertical and horizontal R&D model in some aspects distinct
from Howitt (1999), our results coincide only partially with those presented by Cozzi
(2005). Both models predict a smaller number of ﬁrms in the asymmetric equilibrium
with sunspots, in order to enhance the returns to horizontal entry, given subsequent
higher obsolescence (creative destruction) rate. In our model, returns are increased be-
cause relative average quality is higher when the number of varieties is lower, whereas
in Cozzi (2005), returns are increased because marginal returns to horizontal R&D are
higher when R&D outlays are lower, which in turn imply a smaller number of industries
in equilibrium.
More importantly, balanced growth dynamics are distinct. In our model, long-run
aggregate growth is not aﬀected by the “waves of enthusiasm”, while Cozzi’s model pre-
19dicts a higher aggregate growth rate, due to a higher aggregate rate of vertical innovation.
The mechanism behind our result is twofold. One one hand, we consider an explicit gen-
eral BGP equilibrium where ﬁnancial markets link the eﬀective return to vertical R&D
(the real interest rate plus the average rate of creative destruction) to the fundamentals,
which must be the same whether we consider the symmetric equilibrium or the asymmet-
ric equilibrium with sunspots. This “forces” an intra-R&D composition eﬀect between
“mature” and newly-born industries, thus dampening the impact of animal spirits on
aggregate vertical R&D intensity. The latter, together with the fact that in our model
vertical innovation is the ultimate growth engine, in the sense that it sustains both va-
riety expansion and aggregate growth, implies that the “waves of enthusiasm” have no
impact on the growth rate of the number of varieties and on the aggregate growth rate.
However, our model predicts a positive impact on the level of per-capita consumption,
in contrast to Cozzi’s negative eﬀect.
This set of results suggests that the risk that policy intervention, by acting itself as
a potential source of extrinsic uncertainty, sees its eﬀectiveness reduced - as explained
by Cozzi (2005) - may ultimately be more relevant to the impact of public policy on
the industrial structure and the level of consumption per capita than on the long-run
aggregate growth rate.
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A. Derivation of the aggregate resource constraint with
“waves of enthusiasm”
Consider the households’ balance sheet (35), in the text. Hence, we can characterise the
change in the value of equity as
_ a(t) = (t)  
 1  _ N(t) + _ (t)  
 1  N(t) (50)













from (33) and (37) - in the right-hand side, to get
(r(t) + A  I)  a(t)   A  I  a(t) + w(t)  L   C(t) + (t) =






 (t)  
 1  N(t) + (t)  
 1  _ N(t) (51)
Then, using (31) solved in order to , together with Y   X = wL + N,23in (51), we
ﬁnd
23Having in mind the price markup p =
1
, equations (4), (8), (10) and (11), and that, in equilibrium,
w and p are equated to the marginal product of labour and the marginal product of intermediate
goods, respectively, it is easily shown that wL = (1   )Y , X = 
2Y , pX = Y and total proﬁts
 = X  (p   1) = Y   
2Y . Also, have in mind that, by deﬁnition of q(j;  !;t), total proﬁts can be
represented as  = (j;  !;t)  N.
22Y (t)   X(t)   C(t) + (t) = A  I  

1   a(t) + (t)  
 1  _ N(t) (52)




 1   1) _ N (53)
such that (52) reads
Y (t) = X(t) + C(t) + Rn(t) + A  Rv(t)
which is (23), in the text. Observe that (53) means that the “real pure proﬁt” term, ,in
(36) must capture the net increase in the households’ balance sheet induced by horizontal
entry, in turn explained by the fact that the average value from entry exceeds the average
cost, V > , when  > 1 (thus implying 
 1 > 1). Notice that  is zero in the symmetric
equilibrium,  = 1 (in that case, 
 1 = 1), which means that in fact (36) generalises (2).
B. Model with static decreasing returns to horizontal R&D
We consider ﬁrst the symmetric equilibrium. Let horizontal R&D technology (18), in the





where 0 > 0, 00 < 0 and () as deﬁned in the text. Term (Rn) introduces static de-
creasing returns to horizontal R&D in the model. We keep term 1
(N) in (54), as the
dynamic decreasing returns to horizontal R&D implied by (N), 0 > 0, are necessary
to eschew the explosive growth that would occur, e.g., if  were constant over time.26
More speciﬁcally, in line with Segerstrom (2000), let _ Ne(t) be the contribution to the
instantaneous ﬂow of new goods by R&D ﬁrm e in the horizontal-R&D sector and Rne(t)
the ﬂow of resources devoted to horizontal R&D by e at t (measured in units of ﬁnal-
good output Y ), such that _ Ne = 1
(N)(Rne). Given perfect competition among R&D
ﬁrms, each of them takes as given the marginal value of entry, V . R&D ﬁrms solve
maxRne _ Ne  V   Rne, with the associated ﬁrst-order condition implying, under a conve-
nient aggregation procedure, V = (N) 1
0(Rn). Combining the latter with (21), in the





  L  0(Rn)
(55)











25In this appendix we omit time subscripts for sake of simplicity.
26More generally, we need some type of dynamic friction in horizontal entry in order to eschew the
explosive growth that would otherwise occur given the feedback between horizontal and vertical
innovation in a lab-equipment setup. It can be shown that the speciﬁcation   (Q), 
0 > 0, 
00 < 0,
produces a similar result.
23For concreteness, assume the speciﬁcation (Rn) = R1
n and (N) = N2, with 0 <

















> 1. Solving (54) in order to Rn, together with (55), leads to
Rn = gN  1    L  Q (57)
N =











Now, we focus on the asymmetric equilibrium under Assumption 1. Re-iterating the















2 (0;1);8r;I;> 0;  2 (1;1). Given (59), we get
Rn = gN  1    L  
  Q (60)
N =

  L  
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It is straightforward to show that the presence of (Rn) in (54) reduces the (negative)
impact of “waves of enthusiasm” on Rn vis-á-vis the symmetric equilibrium without
sunspots (in absolute terms), because now 
 multiplies by 1 < 1 in (60). The eﬀect of
(Rn) on the (negative) impact of “waves of enthusiasm” on N is ambiguous: since Rn
feeds back on N through 0(Rn) - 
 multiplies by 0(Rn) in (61) - the exact magnitude
depends also on the level of 0(Rn), in particular whether it is below or above unity.
C. Existence and uniqueness of Ap > 1
We give a sketch of the formal proof for the existence and uniqueness of the value of
Ap > 1, given the set (;p;gs
N;Is), that solves for the asymmetric BGP both under
Assumption 1 (p = 1 ) Ap = A) and Assumption 2 (p 2 (0;1)). Recall from (41) that
I  I(Ap) = 1
ApIs, where Is =  
      g. Thus, we wish to show that the equation
27Given this speciﬁcation for (Rn), the aggregation procedure that allows one to derive (54), and thus





1 1, where M is the total number of ﬁrms in
the horizontal-R&D sector (e.g., Segerstrom and Zolnierek, 1999). With all R&D ﬁrms choosing the





where _ N = M  _ Ne and Rn = M  Rne. Observe that, as M ! 1, the aggregate ﬂow of new goods
does not change, but the individual contribution of any ﬁrm e becomes negligible.
24Ap = 1 + (   1) 
gN  Ap
gN  Ap +   Is  p  (Ap) (62)
has a unique and ﬁnite solution, i.e., that the locus of Ap (i.e., the 45º line) and (Ap)
coincide for a unique and ﬁnite value of Ap > 1. Firstly, see that (Ap) is a continuous
increasing concave function, that is, for Ap ﬁnite,
d(Ap)
dAp
= (   1)
gN  p











= 2(   1)
g2
N  p










gNAp+Is > 0. Secondly, note that limAp!1
d
dAp = 0. Thus, (Ap) is mono-
tonically increasing such that 9Ap > 1;
d
dAp < 1. The latter, combined with (0) = 1,
implies that the curve (Ap) and the 45º line cross only once, at a given Ap > 1 ﬁnite.
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￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿
" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿4￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿2 ￿ # 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ # 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 5 ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ # ￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* 6 ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿ # 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿3￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :￿ ￿ :￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ) ￿ # ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ # ￿ # ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
7 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿: ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 5 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ - ￿
1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿7 ￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿, < 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- 4 ￿
2 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, < 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 9 * ￿ % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- 5 ￿
2 ￿ 9 ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿; ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- 8 ￿
= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿’ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿= > ? > &
@ A A B ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- ￿￿
￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿C ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
* 7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿C ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿* 7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ; ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- ￿￿
= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿= > ? ? &
@ A A B ￿￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿
2 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0 ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ? ￿￿￿ ￿ * ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿- - ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* 7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :￿ ￿ :￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D ￿# ￿￿￿-￿￿5 ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0 ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
E ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 5 ￿
@ ￿ A ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ < ￿2 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿. ￿￿ ￿￿￿1 1 ￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿8 ￿￿￿￿ F ￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ( # ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ > # ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿D ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :￿ ￿ :￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿￿" # ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ * ￿ ￿ # ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿. ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
G 8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ - ￿
￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿ ￿ # ; ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ $ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿’ # ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿6 ￿ # ￿￿1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿E ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿D ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿1￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" * % 2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿# ￿ + ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿9 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿8 ￿￿H ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* 6 ￿￿￿+ # ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿I￿’ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, < 2 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿
1￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿8 2 1 : ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
. ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿ 6 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 4 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿ ￿￿￿3￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿J￿’ ￿4￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿C - ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ; ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿
& = 1D ￿ = & = 1:￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿= ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ E ￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿
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